Recognizing the growing momentum among policy makers, civil society, and corporations, track 1 of this year’s open call for proposals invites concepts notes for work responding to strategic opportunities in the field of spyware accountability within the next 18 months.

This track is designed for organizations seeking funding for specific interventions, such as targeted research, investigative work, advocacy or litigation strategies, and focused awareness initiatives in response to current political developments. We are also open to applications seeking to pilot new and untested approaches and issue areas related to spyware accountability. Track 1 is primarily addressed to organizations with an existing track record of addressing spyware accountability issues but applications from groups new to the topic will also be considered.

The list of examples below is merely for illustrative purposes and we explicitly encourage applicants to submit specific interventions that respond to opportunities in their context and area of expertise.

Known opportunities:

• Advocating for the effective implementation of the executive order on ‘Prohibition on Use by the United States Government of Commercial Spyware that Poses Risks to National Security’ or the international commitments on Countering the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware.

• Advocating for effective government use of sanctions, visa restrictions, and other tools limit the abuse and proliferation of spyware and monitor the effectiveness of measures already in place

• Work that supports follow-on action from collaborative processes to fight spyware, such as the Pall Mall process.

• Advocating for effective implementation of export controls related to spyware in national jurisdictions around the world, including in EU member states which committed to reforms in 2021 and were presented as part of the newly proposed economic security package in January 2024.

• Monitoring implementation, enforcement and the impact of the controversial paragraph 4(2) regulating the use of spyware by EU member states in the EU Media Freedom Act.

• Coordinated advocacy efforts pushing for the implementations on the recommendations of the EU PEGA committee and similar national level efforts.

Potential opportunities: You may also make the case for specific opportunities you see in the next 18 months to make critical progress. Topics include, but are not limited to:

• Near-term opportunities around policy, litigation, investigation, and engagement throughout the Global South / Global Majority.

• Opportunities to seek justice for communities and individuals affected by spyware abuses such as supporting ongoing legal procedures or engaging in litigation and corresponding discovery processes to uncover information and hold enablers and perpetrators of spyware abuses to account.

• Direct advocacy to decision-makers in government, international nongovernmental bodies, or the private sector with influence over key spyware accountability topics like export controls, vulnerability disclosures, and other national and supra-national policies.

• Advocate with technology companies to introduce stronger security features to protect their users similarly to Apple’s lockdown mode and systematically inform victims of spyware abuses.

• Engagement with investors about the potential material risks of spyware abuses in their investment portfolios.

• Investigating and exposing the dealings and tactics of specific individuals and corporations in the spywares supply chain, including technical and financial enablers, developers, vendors and clients.

• Communication efforts designed to make the impact of spyware abuses on individuals, organizations and communities more accessible to the wider public, but also policy makers and civil society, using innovative visualization and storytelling approaches.

• Time-sensitive convenings or events to take advantage of an expected development in the field of spyware accountability.

• Submissions for Track 1 will need to clearly articulate the near-term opportunity you see, the activities you propose to take advantage of the opportunity, and the outcome you hope to achieve within the next 18 months.

Please note that due to requirements under US law, the fund is not able to support lobbying activities. You can learn more about what does and does not constitute lobbying in this guide.

Like last year, we recognize that the broader civil society field focused on spyware accountability lacks the capacity needed for the significant work ahead. This includes a lack of global diversity in spyware accountability organizations, uneven capacities on regulatory advocacy, policy advocacy, litigation and more. This track is designed for organizations that seek to build, expand and strengthen their own capacity, expertise and networks, or support other groups and individuals in those efforts as well as groups that seek to contribute to the wider field of organizations advancing spyware accountability.

Areas of work that may qualify for funding include:

• Threat intelligence and research capabilities focused on spyware technologies against civil society and social movements.

• Building organizational capacity of both existing and emergent civil society cybersecurity research and advocacy groups, and increasing field coordination.

• Building the capacity of human rights defenders and journalists - individuals, organizations, and networks - to improve visibility, identify and respond to spyware attacks.

• Coordinated strategic sharing of information, research and best practices on advanced threats among response organizations.

• Advocacy or litigation strategies and interventions focused on the global spyware trade, use of advanced spyware against civil society, and accountability of corporations responsible for the proliferation of these technologies.

• Enabling civil society to more effectively partner with device manufacturers, software developers, commercial security firms, and other relevant companies to identify and address vulnerabilities as well as the design and implementation of protections that directly address the risks and harms of spyware.

• Implementation, management and use of technical infrastructure that takes advantage of threat intelligence to identify and contain targeted incidents, and that facilitate the sharing of intelligence across the field.

• Investigation and support for the harms and consequences of spyware. This may include: developing psychosocial support programs for high-risk individuals and organizations, understanding the longer term harms that are experienced by individuals and organizations following targeted spyware attacks, and researching the impact of spyware technologies on democratic societies.

• Support for additional safety and security measures directly related to proposed work in any of the areas of work listed above.

• Raising awareness and developing strategies to mitigate the impact of lawfare tactics by hostile actors against civil society organizations and individuals, such as intentionally abusing the legal system to discredit and harm civil society groups working on spyware accountability.

• Coalition and network building to strengthen coordination and collaboration in the global spyware accountability field.

What is not being considered for this round of funding:

• New end-user technology development (i.e., new secure messaging applications)

• Generally addressing the cybersecurity needs of civil society through trainings, capacity building, etc.

This recent report from Freedman Consulting may be a helpful way to orient the landscape of work that is possible and needed for global spyware accountability.